How Much Would an Extension of the Tengiz Contract Cost?

The Kazakh side, according to Bloomberg, wants the project participants to make a one-time payment—a bonus for extending the contract—of around $10 billion. Astana also wants to increase its stake in the project from 20% to 35%. No one has officially confirmed this report so far.

Tengizchevroil LLP (TCO) is a joint venture that develops the Tengiz and Korolev fields. Its current shareholders are Chevron (USA) — 50%, ExxonMobil (USA) — 25%, KazMunayGas (KMG, Kazakhstan) — 20%, and Lukoil (Russia) — 5%. An ownership stake in such a venture entitles its holder to a corresponding share of the profits. If KMG’s stake rises to 35%, it will receive more than a third of the distributable proceeds.

The current agreement was signed in 1993 for a 40-year term and expires in 2033. After that date, the right to develop the field formally reverts to the state. That is why the parties are negotiating now. Chevron CEO Mike Wirth confirmed to Bloomberg in September 2025 that formal negotiations had begun. He later described the extension as one of the company’s three top priorities. The reason is clear: Kazakhstan accounts for more than 10% of Chevron’s proven reserves, and TCO generates a major share of the company’s cash flow.

How Much Oil Does Tengiz Produce?

In 2024, TCO produced 27.8 million tonnes of oil. In 2025, production exceeded 39 million tonnes, an increase of around 40%. The growth followed completion of the Future Growth Project (FGP), construction of a new, third oil-processing plant, and installation of a system that reduces pressure at the wellheads and enables higher production. The third plant started operating in January 2025, and daily output had already reached 870,000 barrels that month.

That growth came at a high cost. The expansion cost $49 billion. When the project was approved in 2016, its budget was $36.8 billion, meaning the cost overrun was roughly one-third. Oil in place is estimated at 3.1 billion tonnes. However, there is a difference between oil underground and oil that can actually be recovered. Only a portion can be extracted from the reservoir, and the size of that recoverable portion will determine how long the project can generate revenue after 2033.

The current year has shown that even an experienced operator is not immune to disruptions. In January, a transformer fire and restrictions on oil intake by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) affected production. Design capacity was restored by the end of March. The CPC is the main pipeline carrying Kazakh oil to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Almost all Tengiz exports depend on it. Extending the contract will not eliminate this risk, which must be factored into any calculations.

Revenue and Profit

According to TCO’s report, revenue exceeded $19.4 billion in 2023, was $19 billion in 2024, and reached $22 billion in 2025 (+16%). Oil accounted for most of this: $18.6 billion in 2023, $17.8 billion in 2024, and $20.7 billion in 2025. The remainder, around $1 billion a year, came from sulfur, liquefied gas, and natural gas.

This raises a question: why did revenue grow by only 16% when production rose by 40%? The answer is price. By a rough estimate, TCO sold oil at an average of about $67 per barrel last year, compared with approximately $80 the year before. These figures can be estimated by dividing oil revenue by production in barrels. According to the company, the conversion factor is about 7.9 barrels per tonne. The calculation is approximate, but it helps explain why volumes rose sharply while revenue increased more modestly.

Net profit was $5.3 billion in 2023 and around $2.1 billion in both 2024 and 2025. In other words, less than $10 of every $100 in revenue became profit last year. That seems unusually low for a world-class oil field.

One possible explanation is depreciation and amortization. Depreciation rose from $2.7 billion in 2023 to $6.9 billion in 2024 and $9.6 billion in 2025. The notes state that, over these three years, completed expansion assets worth around $41 billion were transferred from construction in progress to property, plant, and equipment. Their cost is now being depreciated. Most likely, the depreciation schedule runs for the remaining contract term, through 2033.

To understand how much the business actually earns, analysts use EBITDA (earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes). Adding depreciation and interest expenses to profit before tax, and subtracting interest income, gives approximately $12.9 billion, or 59% of revenue. This calculation suggests that the production business itself remains highly profitable, while the relatively modest net profit is largely due to depreciation charges.

Cash flow provides an even clearer picture: the actual cash generated by operating activities. TCO generated almost $7 billion in 2023, $8.8 billion in 2024, and $10.2 billion in 2025. Capital expenditure on construction, drilling, and equipment fell from $4.3 billion in 2023 to $2.4 billion in 2024 and $1.2 billion in 2025, as the major construction phase ended. The difference between operating cash flow and capital expenditure is free cash flow—the money that can be distributed to owners or used to repay debt. In 2025, it was close to $9 billion. Distributions to shareholders of $7.8 billion were announced, compared with $4.8 billion the previous year and $5.5 billion in 2023.

What Does the State Receive?

TCO pays two types of royalties—payments to the state for the right to extract natural resources, charged on sales volumes regardless of profitability. In 2025, basic royalties amounted to $2.2 billion and additional royalties to $2.6 billion. Additional royalties rise with project profitability, so the state receives more when performance is strong. Corporate income tax at a rate of 30% amounted to $0.92 billion. This figure is relatively small largely because of the high depreciation discussed above: tax is levied on profit, which is reduced by depreciation charges.

TCO itself reports that direct payments to Kazakhstan reached $10.6 billion in 2025 and totaled around $212 billion since 1993. However, the company’s definition includes not only taxes and royalties, but also tariffs and fees paid to state-owned companies, profit distributions to the Kazakh shareholder, purchases of local goods and services, and salaries paid to Kazakh employees. Comparing $10.6 billion with revenue of $21.99 billion gives nearly half. But another question remains: is the state’s equity stake sufficient in a business that generates this much cash flow? The state receives taxes regardless, but dividends only in proportion to its ownership stake.

Debt and Its Role in the Negotiations

TCO’s total debt at the end of 2025 was $7 billion, down from $9 billion a year earlier. The company borrowed to finance the expansion.

The debt is divided into series—separate issuances of loans with their own maturity dates. Series A was issued in 2016 and is being repaid in two instalments, in February and August of this year. Series B was issued in 2020 and fully repaid in August last year. Series C, amounting to $3 billion, is due in August 2030. Each series consists of bonds and loans. Bonds are debt securities purchased by institutional investors. The loans were provided by the shareholders themselves, Chevron and ExxonMobil, on the same terms as those offered to bondholders.

An important detail lies beneath the surface. Of TCO’s $7 billion in debt, $3.5 billion consists of loans from Chevron and $1.7 billion from ExxonMobil. Other investors hold the bonds, which account for another $1.7 billion. This means that TCO owes three-quarters of its debt to its own shareholders. This is common practice for projects of this kind. But the implication for negotiations is straightforward: the debt does not put pressure on investors because most of the money is owed back to them. Nor does it give Kazakhstan leverage, because there is no real threat of non-payment.

The debt burden is modest. TCO’s net debt is around $5.9 billion, a very low level for a company of this scale. If it takes on no new borrowing, it could reach the contract’s expiry date debt-free.

At the same time, during the construction years TCO reduced dividends and borrowed around $20 billion, while the state received less.

According to Chevron’s own forecast, TCO will generate around $5 billion in free cash flow in 2025 and around $6 billion in 2026. If a $10 billion bonus were distributed according to ownership stakes, Chevron’s share would be about $5 billion—roughly one year’s cash flow from the project.

What Is TCO Worth?

There are two ways to estimate the value. The first is based on accounting figures. Equity—the difference between a company’s assets and liabilities—stood at $29.6 billion at the end of 2025. Adding net debt gives an enterprise value of around $35.4 billion.

The second method values the business based on its cash flows. A company is worth the future cash it will generate for its owners, discounted to today’s value. This process is called discounting. It reflects the fact that $100 today is worth more than the same $100 in five years, because money available today can be invested. We use a 10% discount rate.

The period remaining until the current contract expires is around 6.5 years. In the base case, we assume annual free cash flow before interest payments of $8.5 billion. This is below the 2025 level because capital expenditure is expected to rise, while taxes will increase as depreciation declines.

At an oil price of around $70 per barrel, the value of 100% of the project is approximately $40 billion. At $55 or $60, it is around $28 billion; at $85 or $90, around $50 billion. KMG’s 20% stake would be worth between $6 billion and $10 billion, or about $8 billion in the base case.

According to figures cited by some experts, Rystad Energy estimated Lukoil’s net cash flow from its 5% stake in TCO at $2.8 billion over five years. That implies around $56 billion for the entire project over five years, at the upper end of our range. Current prices are also above the base-case assumption. In late summer, Brent traded at around $93 amid tensions in the Middle East. But it would be a mistake to build such prices into assumptions for 2033 and beyond.

The extension has a value of its own. Suppose that after 2033 the project operates for another 17 years at a plateau—a sustained high production level—with moderate capital expenditure and free cash flow of around $7 billion a year. The present value of that period would be about $30 billion. The result is highly sensitive to tax terms and the size of recoverable reserves.

Now compare that with the request. A $10 billion payment represents roughly one-third of the extension’s value. An additional 15% stake in the project, covering both the remaining contract term and the extension, would be worth around $10 billion under this estimate. If that stake were transferred free of charge, the state would effectively be asking for around $20 billion out of $30 billion. Investors are unlikely to accept that. If Kazakhstan pays a fair price for the stake, however, the effective price of the extension is the bonus—about one-third of its value. This may be where the main bargaining takes place.

What Happens After 2033?

If the contract is not extended, the project will come under state control in 2033. In theory, Kazakhstan could continue production itself or hire service companies. Tengiz remains one of the deepest and most technically challenging oil fields in the world. Its oil has a high sulfur content, reservoir pressure is high, and the climate is harsh. KMG is financially strong, but its experience managing a project of this complexity remains limited.

There is also a less obvious risk. If the contract is not extended, investors may decide that from 2029 or 2030 onward there is little reason to invest more than the bare minimum. New wells, maintenance of existing wells, gas injection into the reservoir, and equipment replacement take years to pay off. Production could then begin to decline before the contract expires. Delaying the decision is in neither side’s interest.

If the extension goes ahead, the country will preserve this stream of payments. There is also a less obvious benefit. Once the cost of the completed facilities has been fully depreciated, depreciation charges will fall. Reported profit will rise, along with tax payments and dividends. If distributions remain at the 2025 level of $7.8 billion, each additional 15 percentage points of ownership would generate around $1.17 billion a year. Jobs would also be preserved.

The actual picture after 2033 will depend on the quality of the contract, not merely on whether it is extended. The question is how to secure greater returns when prices are high while preventing production from falling when prices are low.

Azerbaijan’s Experience

In 2017, the production-sharing contract for the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli (ACG) block was extended to 2050, 25 years beyond the original term. The consortium led by BP agreed to pay a $3.6 billion bonus to the State Oil Fund, spread over eight years rather than paid all at once. The stake held by Azerbaijan’s state-owned SOCAR rose from 11.65% to 25% as the foreign participants’ shares were reduced; Chevron and ExxonMobil were among those participants. President Ilham Aliyev said the state’s share of profit oil—the portion of production remaining after investors recover their costs—would reach 75%.

In 2017, the block produced around 585,000 barrels per day, or approximately 213 million barrels a year. The $3.6 billion bonus equated to around $17 per barrel of annual production. Kazakhstan produces around 310 million barrels a year, so its $10 billion request amounts to approximately $32 per barrel. Astana is therefore asking for almost twice as much. The comparison is rough, however. After its expansion, Tengiz is at a production plateau, whereas the Azerbaijani block was already moving toward decline in 2017. Oil prices were also different.

What Should Kazakhstan Demand?

Kazakhstan should seek not only more money, but also a more robust deal structure. A good starting point is the form of payment. Some experts argue that the bonus should not be recoverable through project costs or deductible against taxes. It would be sensible to spread it over several years, as in Azerbaijan, and add a supplementary payment if oil prices exceed an agreed threshold.

Kazakhstan has already announced its pre-emptive right to acquire Lukoil’s 5% stake in TCO and submitted an application to the US Treasury. The project has a sanctions exemption in place until 14 October 2027. If the transaction is approved, KMG could increase its stake to 25%, leaving a request for Chevron and ExxonMobil to relinquish a further 10%, rather than 15%. The purchase price could be below market value.

A sliding scale of additional royalties should be introduced, with the rate rising alongside oil prices and capturing a larger share of windfall profits above a threshold. In return, investors can reasonably expect clear guarantees that the terms will remain stable. For Chevron, this is the price of certainty for the next 17 years.

TCO’s obligations regarding the volume and price of oil and gas supplied to the domestic market should also be specified. Kazakhstan faces a gas shortage and has to import gas, while more oil is needed for domestic refining. A refinery with a capacity of 10 million tonnes a year is planned. The extension terms should therefore include commitments to supply feedstock to the domestic market.

KMG needs roles in operational management, access to technology, a plan to replace foreign executives with Kazakh nationals, and the right to audit costs. The latter is important because costs determine the profits shared among shareholders.

Dependence on the CPC and the route through Russia reduces the value of the state’s stake. The project participants could commit to financing alternative export routes.

Full audited financial statements, with detailed breakdowns of major line items, should be available to the state and the public. A decommissioning fund is also needed, with money set aside in advance to plug wells and clean up the site rather than leaving this until the final years. Environmental liabilities should be assessed now, while all parties have an incentive to reach a deal.

Kazakhstan could also invite Asian national oil companies and investment funds to bid for part of the additional 15% stake. China’s CNPC, for example, already participates in the Kashagan project. This alternative would help keep any negotiator—including Chevron—disciplined.

The clock is ticking not only toward 2033. The sanctions exemption for Lukoil’s stake runs until October 2027. The fate of that 5% stake should be clarified by then, which means the broader deal will need to take shape even earlier.

OPEC+ production quotas are another issue. In 2020, these restrictions reduced Tengiz output by 11%. The contract must clearly specify how losses from any future production cuts will be shared; otherwise, the burden may fall unevenly.

There is also a climate risk. TCO reports that it has reduced emissions intensity by 78% since 2000. But in two decades, carbon pricing could become a real factor affecting exported oil. It is better to allocate this risk in advance than to argue about it later.

Tengiz remains Kazakhstan’s most important economic asset and one of Chevron’s key assets. The financial statements show a project in its prime: production is up 40%, cash flow is growing, and debt is low. Creditors are not putting pressure on investors, and a $10 billion request is within their means. But the state has no reason to accept just any terms.

Expert Opinion

Olzhas Baidildinov, oil and gas analyst:

“The situation is not very clear. For some reason, we learn all our important oil-industry news either from Bloomberg or Reuters, rather than from official sources or the Kazakh press. That is not quite right.

There have already been reports that Exxon and Chevron had begun negotiations on an extension. Then our ministry said there were no negotiations. After that, the companies once again confirmed that talks had started.

I think they want to keep the project. Even if not because of production levels or price expectations after 2030, then at least because of the reserves. They clearly need these reserves for their market capitalization, stock-market valuation, and company valuation. Since everyone is confident in the reserves here, these are not merely proven reserves on paper—they are figures that analysts and stock markets recognize.

In my view, it is premature to talk about a $10 billion bonus. It is unclear whether such a bonus actually exists, what terms would be attached to it, and what it would entail: payments directly to the state, social contributions, or some other obligations.

For example, Kazakhstan has a Chevron Direct Investment Fund, which I have also analyzed. The expectation was that Chevron would invest in, say, manufacturing or projects related to the production of oilfield equipment, and so on. But it turned out that Chevron finances whatever it considers appropriate.

If you look at its website, you will find projects involving door manufacturing and metal equipment, and they are not even in western Kazakhstan. So it is not very clear what authority the fund has, what was stipulated in the agreements, or why the money is not specifically going toward developing the western regions where the oil is produced.

At the same time, Chevron is considering exiting its investments within three to four years, and doing so at a profit. There are also required rates of return.

Not every company or investor can meet such strict conditions. The $10 billion could take a similar form. For example, they might say: ‘We will establish a fund and invest $10 billion in certain manufacturing businesses in Kazakhstan.’ But the requirements could be so strict that not everyone would qualify, and those who do would still have to repay the money with a profit. It is therefore very difficult to draw conclusions at this stage.

As for increasing the state’s stake, I would say that 35% is a generous maximum for some and a bare minimum for others. Look at Azerbaijan, where the contract was extended on fairly favourable terms. (See also: ‘What Lies Behind the Transfer of Management of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline from BP to SOCAR’.) Azerbaijan had a weaker negotiating position than Kazakhstan because its production volumes were no longer as large. Today, Atyrau Region alone produces more than all of Azerbaijan. Yet Azerbaijan’s production is declining while its national company’s stake is increasing.

If we look at the Persian Gulf, for example, ADNOC (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company) owns 90% of the country’s oil and gas production in the UAE. KMG has only 24–26%, and that share is declining as production falls.

It also matters what terms the companies want for an extension and what terms Kazakhstan is prepared to accept. Leaks in foreign media suggest that the consortium is seeking even more favourable tax terms, allegedly because the field is being depleted and the investment in the FGP has not been recovered. The result could be that, despite increasing its stake, Kazakhstan would not actually receive more money. In other words, the 35% stake could generate less revenue than the country receives today because the amounts subject to taxes and payments would shrink.

To me, the right question is: why should we extend this agreement at all? It ends in 2033. And that may be just fine. KMG could bring in another strategic partner. But it may be better, as in Iraq and other countries, simply to hire a service company. If I am not mistaken, SLB (formerly Schlumberger) holds the main service contract at Tengiz and provides services to the field. We could negotiate with it on similar terms. I believe Kazakhstan should start from a stronger negotiating position.”